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ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURTS RULE 60(b)(7)
CHANGE OP PRIOR RULINGS NOT GOVERNED
BY RULE 54(b) STANDARD
Defendant argues that it makes no difference whether
Judge Young considered the Motion for Relief from Order Denying
Summary Judgment under Rule 60(b)(7), U. R. Civ. P., as
originally filed, or under Rule 54(b), U. R. Civ. P. as now
argued.

To the contrary, the two rules set different standards.

See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988).
Rule 54(b) means "[a]ny judge is free to change his or
her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally
rendered . . . ."

Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors,

761 P.2d at 45. However, Rule 60(b)(7) implicates "the xlaw of
the case' doctrine [which] is employed to avoid delay and to
prevent injustice" such as expense and delay resulting from
repetitive consideration of the same issues in a single case.
Id.

"Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in

complex cases as subsequent developments in the case might
suggest . . . .

The *law of the case doctrine' nonetheless . . .

create[s] a kind of presumption that the court's prior rulings,
even if not certified as final under Rule 54(b), were correct and
should stand."

Id., pp. 44-45, n. 5.

Judge Wilkinson denied summary judgment on the impliedin-fact contract issue.

Defendant asked Judge Wilkinson to

change his mind in its first motion to reconsider in 1991. He
didn't.

Defendant addressed the same issue in 1992 when it asked

Judge Noel to rule, in limine, that plaintiff's evidence of
implied-in-fact contract terms of employment was not relevant or
admissible.

Judge Noel ruled that the evidence of the implied-

in-fact contract was substantial, and he scheduled the case for
trial on the basis of that evidence.
Defendant sought a fourth bite at the apple in 1993
when it asked Judge Young to reconsider Judge Wilkinson's denial
of summary judgment on the implied-in-fact contract issue.

The

Motion to Reconsider (styled as "Defendant's Motion for Relief
from Order", R. at 657-59) offered no new evidence.

It suggested

no "subsequent developments in the case" to justify a different
result.

This directly violated the law of case doctrine.

"The

law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present
the case in a different light, such as when no new material
evidence is introduced."

Salt Lake City Corp. v. James

Constructors, 761 P.2d at 45.
Defendant argues that whether Judge Young applied the
standard of Rule 54(b) or Rule 60(b)(7), the result would have
2

been the same. That is not correct.

Where the judge who made

the initial determination is not available to "change his mind"
pursuant to Rule 54(b), defendant's motion should have been
either denied outright or else held to the very high standards of
Rule 60(b)(7).

That requires "extraordinary" circumstances.

Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah
1982), Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties,
838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 1992).

Defendant didn't even attempt to

meet the higher standard of Rule 60(b)(7).
Defendant relies on Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178
(Utah 1993) to support its argument on this issue.
inapposite.

It is

Timm v. Dewsnup involved a suit filed in September

1980 by lenders on a real estate transaction against their
borrower.
1981.

Lender obtained summary judgment on its claim in March

Defendant's counsel did not appear to oppose summary

judgment; and, importantly, the judgment did not address the
defendant/borrower's counterclaim to reform the written
instruments which the plaintiff/lender had sued to enforce. The
defendant filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 1981. The
bankruptcy was converted to Chapter 7 for liquidation in June
1984.

It was not until January 1991 that the Chapter 7

bankruptcy trustee abandoned defendant's counterclaim as an asset
of the bankruptcy estate.

Defendant immediately asked the state
3

trial court for permission to amend her counterclaim and moved
for reconsideration of summary judgment under Rule 54(b), U. R.
Civ. P.

The trial court refused, and ruled that "it had

* implicitly' denied the counterclaim when it granted summary
judgment in 1981, and that the summary judgment was *a final
appealable judgment' at that time."

851 P.2d at 1180. The

Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
In Timm v. Dewsnup, the Supreme Court preserved a
litigant's right to resolution of her case on the merits, where
there was extended delay and where the original circumstances of
the transaction were extremely suspect.

In that case, the same

trial judge was available to "change his mind" when his prior
decisions left the case in a procedural limbo.

(I.e., summary

judgment granted on plaintiff's claim, with no affirmative
disposition of defendant's counterclaim.)

Under the

circumstances, it was error for the trial court to not change its
mind.
In the present case, there is no significant period of
delay, no intervening change of circumstances, and no procedural
limbo created by the prior decision of trial judges Wilkinson and
Noel.

In addition, neither of those judges were available to

consider defendant's motion as a Rule 54(b) opportunity to change
their minds on the basis of "new material facts" as required by
4

Salt Lake Citv Corp, v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah
App. 1988).

Finally, the effect of reconsideration in this case

is devastating to plaintiff.

Judge Young eliminated, rather than

preserved Ms. Power's rights and interests.

Defendant would like

this Court to read Timm v. Dewsnup as requiring reconsideration
any time a motion reasonably analogous to Rule 54(b) is made.

It

doesn't.
Defendant finally argues that application of the lower
threshold of Rule 54(b) was harmless error.

Accepting this

argument would require this Court to assume that Power could
never prevail in front of a reasonable jury.
judges who reviewed the evidence disagree.

Two of three trial

Such an assumption is

contrary to the presumption favoring the non-moving party (here,
the plaintiff) in review of summary judgment.

Johnson v. Morton

Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991); Conder v. A.L.
Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah App. 1987).
An appellate court does not weigh the facts and sustain or
reverse summary judgment based on probabilities of success at
trial.

The issue for appellate review is whether plaintiff had

evidence to prove material issues of fact, not whether defendant
had more or better evidence.

Judge Young's conclusion that "all

[of defendant's] assurances remained consistent with the

5

[plaintiff's] *at will' status" simply ignores substantial record
evidence to the contrary.
Judge Young's error in not requiring defendant to meet
the high standard of Rule 60(b) was extremely harmful.

It

required Power to take a costly and time-consuming appellate
detour enroute to realization of her constitutional right to jury
trial.

The summary judgment should be reversed and the case

remanded for trial on the merits, as originally decided.
POINT II
NUMEROUS QUESTIONS OF FACT
REMAIN FOR JURY TRIAL
In its response, defendant has summarized its best
evidence to refute an implied-in-fact employment contract.

There

is nothing new here. What is important is that defendant does
not contest the plaintiff's substantial evidence which rebuts the
at-will presumption.
hard to imagine.

A clearer question of fact for the jury is

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly

recognized the jury as the appropriate arbiter of such disputes.
Caldwell v. Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah 1989); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001
(Utah 1991); and Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303,
306 (Utah 1992).
Defendant wants to draw this Court into an
inappropriate fact-finding function, focusing solely on
6

defendant's evidence and ignoring plaintiff's support.
should not be seduced into this role.

The Court

The law of at-will and

implied-in-fact contracts in Utah has been stated repeatedly and
clearly.

It is time for juries to decide the cases, guided by

the published legal standards:
Let the jury decide whether defendant
*repeatedly and in the simplest of terms'
reserved the at-will presumption, as defense
counsel claims.
Let the jury decide if defendant's
reservation of at-will (i.e., "although we
generally will follow a disciplinary process
because we are at-will, The Company reserves
the right to terminate a team member
immediately") is "unequivocal" and "clear."
Let the jury decide if an at-will reservation
buried 272 pages inside a 304 page manual is
"clear and conspicuous", as required by
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 999
and 1003, in the face of numerous earlier
calls for team spirit, promises of
advancement through initiative, and personal
pledges of fair treatment and rational
procedures from the defendant's owners.
Let the jury decide if express promises of
specific discipline standards and procedures,
made both in person and in a color video
presentation published company-wide, manifest
an intent of the parties for something other
than at-will. (Johnson v. Morton Thiokol.
818 P.2d at 1001).
Let the jury decide if defendant's frequent,
specific expressions of loyalty and concern
for employees created an "atmosphere" in
which employees reasonably expected something
other than at-will as a standard by which
7

they would be treated. Thurston v. Box Elder
County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992).
Let the jury decide if the 1 hour and 15
minute video presentation of defendant's
President and Chairman of the Board, with its
numerous factual scenarios stating explicitly
what was fair in the way of employee
treatment, was "sufficiently definite to
operate as a contract provision." Johnson v.
Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 1002.
Let the jury decide what it means when
defendant qualified its employee handbook
with the introductory statement: "we do not
expect this handbook to answer all of your
questions. Your supervisor will be your
major source of information." And then
plaintiff's supervisors and superiors
represented that termination would only occur
for cause and after following disciplinary
processes.
Let the jury decide what was objectively
intended and understood when defendant's
Chairman of the Board represented in living
color that "the values of the company are
without question the most important thing . .
. . One of the things you are going to find
in terms of the values here, is that they're
absolutes. . . . The success of Mrs. Fields
has really been a function of the values of
the company. . . . This is like coming home,
this is like building a relationship [which
you need to understand] early on in your
career with Mrs. Fields
Your
career path with Mrs. Fields . . . more than
anything else depends on your commitment to
this value system. . . . The values of the
company that we are going to elaborate this
morning have not changed from the day that
[Debbie Fields] opened the store in August of
1977. . . . What has changed are almost
every procedure in the company." And those
comments were followed up by defendant's
President, Debbie Fields, who said
8

"commitment to our people: that's number one.
. . . Everything that you do is absolutely
grounded to these values that you will soon
learn about. . . . And I'm real clear. . .
. you also need to know that you can hold me
100% accountable . . . .'
Defendant's citation to cases from other states and
even federal courts should not cloud the issue.

Utah's courts

have consistently held that issues of intent, objective
understandings, and the sufficiency of representations to
constitute contractual terms are questions of fact which should
not be lightly withdrawn from the jury.

The trial court's foray

into fact finding should be corrected by a reversal and remand
for trial on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The appeal can easily be decided on the "law of the
case" doctrine.

Judge Young impermissibly substituted his

judgment in place of two prior refusals to dismiss by Judge
Wilkinson and a consistent factual review by Judge Noel through
Motion in Limine.
peers.

In essence, he sat in appellate review of his

No new facts were offered by the defendant to support

reconsideration.

The new case law offered by defendant in

support of the motion did not change the applicable legal
principles.
The appeal can also be decided on the more fundamental
level of summary judgment standards.
9

Substantial evidence

supports the plaintiffs claim of an implied-in-fact employment
contract which is terminable only for cause after specific
standards of fairness and procedures for discipline are observed.
Defendant doesn't contest the existence of that information.
Rather, it hangs it hat on inclusion of the term "at-will" in the
initial application form which was given to plaintiff as an
administrative afterthought after plaintiff had started work,
which was buried deep in a Policies and Procedures Manual, and
which was expressed equivocally in an Employee Handbook.
Defendant does not contest that written terms can be overridden
by verbal representations, by conduct of parties, or by
subsequent modifications.
The only way for this Court to sustain summary judgment
under these circumstances is to rule, as a matter of law, that
whenever the term "at-will" shows up in employee documents, it
always trumps contrary representations, other terms of
employment, and inconsistent courses of dealing.

Contrary to

defendant's claim (p. 10 of defendant's brief), that is not the
holding of Johnson v. Morton Thiokolf 818 P.2d 997, 1003-4 (Utah
1991), or of any other opinion in Utah.

Such a result would be a

step backward into a darker employment era.

It would encourage

employers to pander for employee loyalty and enhanced performance
with no risk that their words would ever be taken seriously or
10

that they would be held accountable for the normal consequences
which strong expressions of obligation create in all other areas
of commercial endeavor.

Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997,

1005 (Utah 1991) Stewart, J. concurring.
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